Abstract-In open network, cryptographic operations are often performed on insecure, unprotected, and easily-stolen devices, therefore the threat of secret key exposure becomes more and more acute. The paradigm of forward security provides a promising approach to deal with the secret key exposure. This new paradigm guarantees that the compromise of current secret keys does not compromise past secret keys and past communications. Therefore, forward-security can minimize the resulting damage caused by the secret key exposure. In this paper, we present a practical forward-secure public-key encryption (FS-PKE) scheme and prove it to be forward-secure against selectivetime period and adaptive chosen plaintext attacks in the standard model. The main performance parameters of our proposed scheme are independent on the total number of time periods in the scheme. When compared with the existing FS-PKE scheme, our proposed scheme is much more efficient and practical. We also discuss how our scheme achieves chosen ciphertext security in the standard model and in the random oracle model respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
In cryptosystems, the secrecy of the secret key is crucial to the security of the system. However, in open network, cryptographic operations are often performed on insecure and easily-stolen devices. Once a user's secret key is exposed, all security guarantees for this user are lost. As compared with breaking the security of a cryptosystem, it is much easier to steal the secret keys from an insecure device. Therefore, the threat of secret key exposure should be paid much attention and the practical techniques should be proposed to deal with it. Countermeasures for protecting against secret key exposure can be taken on two levels: the hardware level and the software level. On the hardware level, some techniques may be used to eliminate the occurrence of secret key exposure entirely. While this is an important direction of research, such techniques are often inefficient and expensive, and are even impossible in some application. So, it is highly desirable to protect against secret key exposure on the software level. Under the circumstances, a number of methods have been introduced in an attempt to counter this threat. Instead of trying to eliminate secret key exposure entirely, these approaches assume that the secret key exposure will occur and seek to minimize the resulting damage. Among them, the paradigm of forward-security [1] provides a promising approach to deal with the secret key exposure problem. The central idea of forward-security is that the compromise of current secret keys does not compromise past secret keys and therefore past communications.
In a forward-secure cryptosystem, the lifetime of the system is divided into N time periods labeled 0,…,N-1, and the secret keys evolve with the time. The device begins by storing secret key SK 0 . At the beginning of each time period i, the device applies some key-evolving method to the previous secret key SK i-1 in order to derive the secret key SK i which is used in the time period i, and then deletes the previous secret key SK i-1 . Notice that if being in a public-key cryptosystem, the public key is never updated and remains fixed throughout the lifetime of the system while the private key is evolved with the time. A forward-secure cryptosystem guarantees that an adversary who learns the secret key SK i for a time period i will be unable to break the security of the system (in the appropriate sense) for all time periods prior to i. Of course, a forward-secure cryptosystem can not prevent the adversary from breaking the security of the system at time period i and any subsequent time period to i since the adversary obtains the secret key SK i .
A. Related Work
The notion of forward security was first proposed in the context of key-exchange protocols by Günther [2] and later by Diffie, et al. [3] . The notion of non-interactive forward security was proposed by Anderson [1] in 1997 and later formalized in the context of signature by Bellare and Miner [4] . Bellare and Yee [5] provided a comprehensive treatment of forward security in the symmetric-key encryption setting. However, the existence of non-interactive, forward-secure public-key encryption (FS-PKE) schemes has been open for a long while since the question was first posed by Anderson [1] . In Eurocrypt 2003, Canetti, Halevi and Katz [6] formalized the notion of forward security for PKE and proposed the first FS-PKE scheme. We also note that, motivated by work on forward security, the related notions such as key-insulated public-key cryptography [7, 8] and intrusion-resilient public-key cryptography [9] were introduced to deal with the threat of key exposure. These two paradigms also apply some key-evolving approach to update the private keys so as to limit the effect of the private key exposures. However, they both should require a (semi-)trusted server which is never compromised to evolve the private keys and must interact with the server at the beginning of each time period. Obviously, these two paradigms are not practical in certain scenarios.
B. Our Motivation and Contribution
In [6] , Canetti, Halevi and Katz proposed the first noninteractive FS-PKE scheme (CHK03 scheme) based on the hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme proposed by Gentry and Silverberg [10] . However, the dependency of the performance parameters of CHK03 scheme on the total number of time periods is polylogarithmic. Let N=2 l be the total number of distinct time periods, this scheme results in ciphertext/public key/private key of size O(l) and key generation/key update/encryption/decryption of time O(l). Obviously, CHK03 scheme is quite impractical for large values of N. So, it is natural to ask whether an FS-PKE scheme can be constructed so as to the main performance parameters of the scheme are independent on the total number of time periods N.
In this paper, we present a practical FS-PKE scheme where the ciphertext size and the key generation/key update/encryption/decryption costs are independent of the total number of time periods N. The ciphertext in our FS-PKE scheme consists of only three group elements and the decryption requires only two pairing operations. Additionally, instead of associating the time periods with the leaf nodes of the binary key-evolving tree only as was done in [6] , our scheme associate the time periods with all nodes of the key-evolving tree. It results that the depth of the key-evolving tree used in the scheme is much smaller than the CHK03 scheme under the same number of time periods. When compared with the CHK03 scheme, our scheme is much more efficient and practical. We prove our proposed scheme to be forward-secure against selective-time period and adaptive chosen plaintext attacks in the standard model. We also discuss how our scheme achieves chosen ciphertext security in the standard model and in the random oracle model respectively.
C. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the preliminaries, including the definition of FS-PKE and its security notions, bilinear map, and the hardness assumption. In Section III, we present our FS-PKE and prove its security in the standard model. Then, we make a comparison between our proposed scheme and the CHK03 scheme [6] . In Section IV, we introduce how to extend our scheme to achieve chosen ciphertext security in the standard model and in the random oracle model respectively. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We briefly describe the definition of FS-PKE and its security notions, bilinear map, and the hardness assumption used in our security proof.
A. Forward-Secure PKE Scheme Definition 1 [6] . A forward-secure PKE (FS-PKE) scheme is a 4-tuple of PPT algorithms (KeyGen, KeyUpd, Enc, Dec) such that:
The key generation algorithm KeyGen takes as input a security parameter 1 k and the total number of time periods N. It returns a public key PK and an initial private key PK 0 .
The key update algorithm KeyUpd takes as input a public key PK, the index i∈[0, N-1) of the current time period and the associated private key SK i . It returns the private key SK i+1 for the following time period i+1.
The encryption algorithm Enc takes as input a public key PK, an index i of a time period, and a message M. It returns a ciphertext C for the time period i.
The decryption algorithm Dec takes as input a public key PK, an index i∈[0, N) of the current time period, the associated private key SK i and a ciphertext C. It returns a message M or ⊥.
Naturally, it is required that these algorithms must satisfy the following consistency constraint:
For any (PK, SK 0 ) outputted by KeyGen (1 k , N), any index i∈[0, N) and private key SK i correctly generated for this time period, and any message M, we have M = Dec(i, PK, SK i , Enc(i, PK, M)). Roughly speaking, a forward-secure FS-PKE scheme should ensure the secrecy the ciphertexts for all time period prior to i∈[0, N) even if the private keys of the time period i are exposed. In [6] , the security notion FS-CCA (forward-security against chosen ciphertext attacks) for FS-PKE scheme generalizes the standard notion of security for PKE schemes, similar to the way in which the security notions for forward-secure signature schemes of [4] generalize the standard security notions for signature schemes. In the definition of the security notion FS-CCA, the adversary first makes a break-in query to ask for the private key SK i for an arbitrary time period i∈[0, N), then chooses a time period j∈[0, i) on which it wants to be challenged.
Definition 2. A FS-PKE scheme is forward-secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (FS-CCA) if no PPT adversary A has a non-negligible advantage against the challenger in the following game:
Setup. The challenger runs KeyGen (1 k , N) to generate a public key PK and an initial secret key SK 0 . It gives the adversary PK.
Attack. The adversary issues one break-in query breakin(i), one challenge query challenge(j, M 0 , M 1 ) and multiple decryption query dec(k, C), in any order, Next, we define a weak notion of forward-security in which the adversary is required to commit to the target time period ahead of the time to see the public key it will attack. We call this attack scenario selective-time period (ST) attack.
Definition 3. A FS-PKE scheme is forward-secure against selective-time period and adaptive chosenciphertext attacks (FS-ST-CCA) if no PPT adversary
A has a non-negligible advantage against the challenger in the following game:
Initial. The adversary outputs a time period j∈[0, N) on which it wants to be challenged.
Setup. The challenger runs KeyGen (1 k , N) to generate a public key PK and an initial private key SK 0 . It gives the adversary PK.
Attack. The adversary issues one break-in query breakin(i), one challenge query challenge(M 0 , M 1 ) and multiple decryption query dec(k, C), in any order, subject to 0≤j<i<N and k∈[0, N). The challenger responds these queries as follows:
This key is then given to the adversary. − On query challenge(M 0 , M 1 ), a random bit b is selected and the adversary is given C
The adversary is then given the output Dec(k, SK k , C). If the adversary has already received response Similarly, the security notion FS-ST-CPA can be defined for FS-PKE, in which the adversaries are disallowed to issue any decryption queries. Non-degeneracy: e(P,P)≠1for a random generator P ∈ G 1 .
Computability: e(P,Q) can be efficiently computed for all P, Q ∈ G 1 .
C. Hardness Assumption
The security of our scheme is proved under hardness of the Weak Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman inversion (wDBDHI * ) Problem introduced by Boneh, Boyen and Goh in [11] .
Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups of order p. Let P and Q be two random generators of G 1 , and let α be a random element in . Ⅲ A PRACTICAL FORWARD-SECURE PKE SCHEME In this section, we construct a practical FS-PKE scheme by adapting the BBG-HIBE scheme proposed by Boneh, Boyen and Goh [11] and prove it be FS-ST-CPA secure in the standard model.
A. The Construction
In our construction, we use a labeled full binary tree as the key-evolving tree which is a relaxation of the PKGtree in the BBG-HIBE scheme to evolve the users' private keys. To do so, we associate the time periods with all nodes of the binary tree rather than with the leaf nodes as was done in [6] . Assume that the total number of time periods N ≤ 2 l+1 -1, this labeled full binary tree has depth l. The root of the tree is labeled with an empty string ε and furthermore if a node at depth less than l is labeled with a binary code ω then its left child is labeled with ω0 and its right child is labeled with ω1. Each node labeled with in the tree has an associated secret key We now present the details of our FS-PKE scheme. KeyGen: On input a security parameter k∈Z + and the total number of time periods N∈Z + , this algorithm works as follows:
Generate two groups G 1 , G 2 of prime order p and bilinear map e: G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 .
Select a random generator P ∈ G 1 , a ra dom
and set P . 1 = αP Choose random elements P 2 , P 3 , Q 1 ,…,Q l ∈G 1 , where l is the smallest integer satisfying N ≤ 2 l+1 -1. Set = (Q Q i ) be an l-length vector. The public key is PK = (G 1 , G 2 , N, P, P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , Q ) and the initial private key is SK 0 = αP 2 . The message space is MSPC = G 2 and the ciphertext space is CSPC = G 2 ×(G 1 ) 2 .
For simplifying the description of the key update algorithm KeyUpd, we define an additional algorithm to extract the secret keys for two child nodes of a given node in the key evolving-tree as follows:
KeyExtract: On input the public key PK and the secret key sk ω associated with node ω, this algorithm generates and outputs the secret key for nodes ω0 and ω1 as follows:
If the input ω=ε and sk ω =SK 0 =αP 2 (that is, the algorithm is executed for the first time), choose a random Thus decryption recovers M.
our FS-PKE scheme. of our scheme can be reduced from the ha ion holds in (G sh B. Security yze the security of Next, we anal The security rdness of the l-wDBDHI * problem. The reduction adapts the same ideas from the proof in [11] . 
Theorem 1. The above FS-PKE scheme is FS-ST-
Obviously, all the terms in are knows to the algorithm B. Hence, can be computed by B. Using the same method, the algorithm B generates the secret keys for all right siblings of the nodes on the path from the root to the node ω (i) in the key-evolving tree.
Finally, B assembles these secret keys in right sequence as the private key SK i for the time period i and outputs SK i to A.
We note that the algorithm B can also use another method to generate the private key SK i for the time period i. B can firstly generate the private key SK 1 for the time period 1 and then generate the private key SK i for the time period i via KeyUpd(…KeyUpd(PK, SK 1 , 2),…, i). However, this method costs much more time because it has to generate much more secret keys for the nodes in the key-evolving tree. So, we prefer to the prior. This completes the proof of the theorem.
C. Efficiency Comparison
In Table I , we make a comparison between our proposed FS-PKE scheme and the CHK03 scheme [6] in the standard model.
From the table, we can see that the time required for key generation/update and decryption, and the length of ciphertext in our scheme are independent on the total level l of the key-evolving tree. Thus, these parameters are also independent on the total number of time periods N. At the same time, the dependency of these performance parameters of CHK03 scheme on the total number of time periods N is poly-logarithmic. The public key in our scheme consists of only l+4 group elements while the public key in CHK03 scheme consists of 2l+1 group elements. Additionally, instead of associating the time periods with the leaf nodes of the binary keyevolving tree only as was done in [6] , we associate the time periods with all nodes of the key-evolving tree. It results that the depth of the key-evolving tree in our scheme is much smaller than the depth in the CHK03 scheme under the same number of time periods. Therefore, our scheme is much more efficient and practical than CHK03 scheme.
Ⅳ. ACHIEVING FS-ST-CCA SECURITY
In this section, we describe how our proposed scheme can be enhanced so as to achieve forward-security against selective-time period and adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, namely FS-ST-CCA.
A. FS-ST-CCA Security in the Random Oracle Model
In the random oracle model, we can construct a quite efficient FS-ST-CCA secure FS-PKE scheme by applying the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [12, 13] to the proposed FS-ST-CPA secure scheme. Next, we use the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation in [12] to convert the proposed scheme to a FS-ST-CCA secure FS-PKE scheme. Definition 6. Let Π be a FS-PKE scheme. We say that Π is γ-uniform, if for any PK outputted by KeyGen (1 k , N) , any index i∈[0, N), any message x from the message space and any ciphertext y from the ciphertext space,
We require that γ is negligible of the security parameter k. [12] . We refer the readers to [12] for more details.
B. FS-ST-CCA Security in the Standard Model
In the standard model, we can achieve FS-ST-CCA security by applying Lindell's construction technique [14] which is based on [15, 16] . We now present the construction of the FS-ST-CCA secure scheme.
Let Π = (KeyGen, KeyUpd, Enc, Dec) be a FS-PKE scheme which is FS-ST-CPA secure. Let (P, V) be a onetime simulation-sound adaptive Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge (NIZK) proof system [14] for the following NP-language: The proof for this theorem is almost as same as the proof in [14] only with minor modification.
Ⅴ. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a new FS-PKE scheme. The main performance parameters of our proposed scheme are independent on the total number of time periods. Therefore, it is much more efficient and practical than the CHK03 scheme. Our scheme is proved to be FS-ST-CPA secure under hardness of the l-wDBDHI * problem in the standard model. We also discuss how our scheme achieves FS-ST-CCA security in the standard model and in the random oracle model respectively.
